Why visual experience is likely to resist being enacted

Psyche 12 (1) (2006)
Abstract
Alva Noë’s version of the enactive conception in _Action in Perception_ is an important contribution to the study of visual perception. First, I argue, however, that it is unclear (at best) whether, as the enactivists claim, work on change blindness supports the denial of the existence of detailed visual representations. Second, I elaborate on what Noë calls the ‘puzzle of perceptual presence’. Thirdly, I question the enactivist account of perceptual constancy. Finally, I draw attention to the tensions between enactivism and two trends in cognitive neuroscience: the two-visual systems model of human vision and the theory of internal forward models of action
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The Tuning-Fork Model of Human Social Cognition: A Critique☆.Pierre Jacob - 2009 - Consciousness and Cognition 18 (1):229-243.
Perceptual Presence.Jason Leddington - 2009 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 90 (4):482-502.

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