Authors
Rene Jagnow
University of Georgia
Abstract
Representationalists hold that the phenomenal character of a perceptual experience is identical with, or supervenes on, an aspect of its representational content. As such, representationalism could be disproved by a counter-example consisting of two experiences that have the same representational content but differ in phenomenal character. In this paper, I discuss two recently proposed counter-examples to representationalism that involve ambiguous or reversible figures. I pursue two goals. My first, and most important, goal is to show that the representationalist can offer plausible responses to both counter-examples. My second goal is to show the implications of these responses for the nature of the spatial representational contents of perceptual experiences
Keywords Perceptual experience  Representationalism  Spatial representational content  Mach figure
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DOI 10.1007/s11097-011-9204-4
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References found in this work BETA

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Citations of this work BETA

Ambiguous Figures, Attention, and Perceptual Content: Reply to Jagnow.Bence Nanay - 2011 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 10 (4):557-561.
The phenomenology of embodied attention.Diego D’Angelo - 2020 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 19 (5):961-978.
Cognitive Penetrability and Late Vision.Alberto Voltolini - 2020 - Rivista Internazionale di Filosofia e Psicologia 11 (3):363-371.
Aesthetic Opacity.Emanuele Arielli - 2017 - Proceedings of the European Society for Aesthetics.

View all 8 citations / Add more citations

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