Journal of Logic, Language and Information 18 (1):131-158 (2009)
AbstractThe logical omniscience problem, whereby standard models of epistemic logic treat an agent as believing all consequences of its beliefs and knowing whatever follows from what else it knows, has received plenty of attention in the literature. But many attempted solutions focus on a fairly narrow specification of the problem: avoiding the closure of belief or knowledge, rather than showing how the proposed logic is of philosophical interest or of use in computer science or artificial intelligence. Sentential epistemic logics, as opposed to traditional possible worlds approaches, do not suffer from the problems of logical omniscience but are often thought to lack interesting epistemic properties. In this paper, I focus on the case of rule-based agents, which play a key role in contemporary AI research but have been neglected in the logical literature. I develop a framework for modelling monotonic, nonmonotonic and introspective rule-based reasoners which have limited cognitive resources and prove that the resulting models have a number of interesting properties. An axiomatization of the resulting logic is given, together with completeness, decidability and complexity results.
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The Logic of Fast and Slow Thinking.Anthia Solaki, Francesco Berto & Sonja Smets - 2021 - Erkenntnis 86 (3):733-762.
Rethinking Epistemic Logic with Belief Bases.Emiliano Lorini - 2020 - Artificial Intelligence 282 (C):103233.
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References found in this work
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From Folk Psychology to Cognitive Science: The Case Against Belief.Stephen P. Stich - 1983 - MIT Press.
Reasoning About Knowledge.Ronald Fagin, Joseph Y. Halpern, Yoram Moses & Moshe Vardi - 1995 - MIT Press.