Hintikka and Cresswell on Logical Omniscience

Logic and Logical Philosophy 15 (3):325-354 (2006)

Authors
Mark Jago
Nottingham University
Abstract
I discuss three ways of responding to the logical omniscience problems faced by traditional ‘possible worlds’ epistemic logics. Two of these responses were put forward by Hintikka and the third by Cresswell; all three have been influential in the literature on epistemic logic. I show that both of Hintikka's responses fail and present some problems for Cresswell’s. Although Cresswell's approach can be amended to avoid certain unpalatable consequences, the resulting formal framework collapses to a sentential model of knowledge, which defenders of the ‘possible worlds’ approach are frequently critical of.
Keywords epistemic logic, nonclassical logics  logical omniscience
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Reprint years 2007
DOI 10.12775/LLP.2006.019
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References found in this work BETA

On Logics of Knowledge and Belief.Robert Stalnaker - 2006 - Philosophical Studies 128 (1):169-199.
Universal Grammar.Richard Montague - 1970 - Theoria 36 (3):373--398.
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