Hyperintensional propositions

Synthese 192 (3):585-601 (2015)
Abstract
Propositions play a central role in contemporary semantics. On the Russellian account, propositions are structured entities containing particulars, properties and relations. This contrasts sharply with the sets-of-possible-worlds view of propositions. I’ll discuss how to extend the sets-of-worlds view to accommodate fine-grained hyperintensional contents. When this is done in a satisfactory way, I’ll argue, it makes heavy use of entities very much like Russellian tuples. The two notions of proposition become inter-definable and inter-substitutable: they are not genuinely distinct accounts of how propositions represent what they represent. Semantic theorists may move freely between the two conceptions of what propositions are. Nevertheless, the two approaches give different accounts of the metaphysical nature of propositions. I argue that the sets-of-worlds view provides an adequate account of the nature of propositions, whereas the Russellian view cannot
Keywords Propositions  Hyperintensionality  Fine-grained content  Impossible worlds  Semantics
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DOI 10.1007/s11229-014-0461-y
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References found in this work BETA
Essence and Modality.Kit Fine - 1994 - Philosophical Perspectives 8:1-16.
Elusive Knowledge.David Lewis - 1996 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 74 (4):549 – 567.
Meaning and Necessity.Rudolf Carnap - 1947 - University of Chicago Press.
Impossible Worlds: A Modest Approach.Daniel Nolan - 1997 - Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 38 (4):535-572.

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Citations of this work BETA
Unity Through Truth.Bryan Pickel - forthcoming - Synthese:1-28.
Property Identity.Paul Audi - 2016 - Philosophy Compass 11 (12):829-840.

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