Impossible Worlds

Noûs 47 (3):713-728 (2013)
Abstract
Impossible worlds are representations of impossible things and impossible happenings. They earn their keep in a semantic or metaphysical theory if they do the right theoretical work for us. As it happens, a worlds-based account provides the best philosophical story about semantic content, knowledge and belief states, cognitive significance and cognitive information, and informative deductive reasoning. A worlds-based story may also provide the best semantics for counterfactuals. But to function well, all these accounts need use of impossible and as well as possible worlds. So what are impossible worlds? Graham Priest claims that any of the usual stories about possible worlds can be told about impossible worlds, too. But far from it. I'll argue that impossible worlds cannot be genuine worlds, of the kind proposed by Lewis, McDaniel or Yagisawa. Nor can they be ersatz worlds on the model proposed by Melia or Sider. Constructing impossible worlds, it turns out, requires novel metaphysical resources.
Keywords Impossible worlds  Ersatzism  Actualism  David Lewis  Counter-possibles
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Reprint years 2015
DOI 10.1111/nous.12051
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References found in this work BETA
Counterfactuals.David K. Lewis - 1973 - Blackwell.
Truth and Truthmakers.D. M. Armstrong - 2004 - Cambridge University Press.
Elusive Knowledge.David Lewis - 1996 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 74 (4):549 – 567.

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Citations of this work BETA
Grounding Entails Counterpossible Non‐Triviality.Alastair Wilson - 2016 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 92 (3):716-728.
The Truth About Impossibility.Janine Reinert - 2018 - Philosophical Quarterly 68 (271):307-327.

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