Logical information and epistemic space

Synthese 167 (2):327 - 341 (2009)
Authors
Mark Jago
Nottingham University
Abstract
Gaining information can be modelled as a narrowing of epistemic space . Intuitively, becoming informed that such-and-such is the case rules out certain scenarios or would-be possibilities. Chalmers’s account of epistemic space treats it as a space of a priori possibility and so has trouble in dealing with the information which we intuitively feel can be gained from logical inference. I propose a more inclusive notion of epistemic space, based on Priest’s notion of open worlds yet which contains only those epistemic scenarios which are not obviously impossible. Whether something is obvious is not always a determinate matter and so the resulting picture is of an epistemic space with fuzzy boundaries.
Keywords Logical information  Epistemic space  Epistemic scenario  Epistemic possibility  Impossible worlds  Open worlds  Rationality
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DOI 10.1007/s11229-008-9411-x
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References found in this work BETA

Vagueness.Timothy Williamson - 1994 - Routledge.
The Things We Mean.Stephen Schiffer - 2003 - Oxford University Press.

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Citations of this work BETA

Hyperintensional Propositions.Mark Jago - 2015 - Synthese 192 (3):585-601.
Impossible Worlds.Mark Jago - 2013 - Noûs 47 (3):713-728.
The Content of Deduction.Mark Jago - 2013 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 42 (2):317-334.
On Conceiving the Inconsistent.Francesco Berto - 2014 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 114 (1pt1):103-121.

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