Propositions as Truthmaker Conditions

Argumenta (2016)
Abstract
Propositions are often aligned with truth-conditions. The view is mistaken, since propositions discriminate where truth conditions do not. Propositions are hyperintensional: they are sensitive to necessarily equivalent differences. I investigate an alternative view on which propositions are truthmaker conditions, understood as sets of possible truthmakers. This requires making metaphysical sense of merely possible states of affairs. The theory that emerges illuminates the semantic phenomena of samesaying, subject matter, and aboutness.
Keywords propositions  truthmakers  truthmaking  hyperintensionality  same-saying  states of affairs  modality  aboutness  subject matter
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