Dialectica 64 (2):187-212 (2010)

Authors
Rene Jagnow
University of Georgia
Abstract
It is a common assumption among philosophers of perception that phenomenal colors are exhaustively characterized by the three phenomenal dimensions of the color solid: hue, saturation and lightness. The hue of a color is its redness, blueness or yellowness, etc. The saturation of a color refers to the strength of its hue in relation to gray. The lightness of a color determines its relation to black and white. In this paper, I argue that the phenomenology of shadows forces us to consider illumination as an additional dimension of phenomenal colors. For this purpose, I will first introduce two different interpretations of shadow-experiences, which Chalmers has called the simple and the complex interpretations, and show that they both fail to account for important phenomenal facts about shadow-experiences. I will then introduce my own alternative interpretation based on the idea that illumination is a dimension of phenomenal colors and explain how it can account for these facts.
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DOI 10.1111/j.1746-8361.2010.01229.x
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References found in this work BETA

Vison.David Marr - 1982 - W. H. Freeman.
Action in Perception.Alva Noë - 2005 - MIT Press.
The Logic Of Perception.Irvin Rock - 1983 - Cambridge: MIT Press.
Mental Reality.Galen Strawson - 1994 - MIT Press.

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Citations of this work BETA

Are Color Experiences Representational?Todd Ganson - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 166 (1):1-20.
Colour Discrimination And Monitoring Theories of Consciousness.René Jagnow - 2012 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 90 (1):57 - 74.
Perceptual Constancy and the Dimensions of Perceptual Experience.John O’Dea - forthcoming - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences:1-14.

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