Shadow‐Experiences and the Phenomenal Structure of Colors

Dialectica 64 (2):187-212 (2010)
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Abstract

It is a common assumption among philosophers of perception that phenomenal colors are exhaustively characterized by the three phenomenal dimensions of the color solid: hue, saturation and lightness. The hue of a color is its redness, blueness or yellowness, etc. The saturation of a color refers to the strength of its hue in relation to gray. The lightness of a color determines its relation to black and white. In this paper, I argue that the phenomenology of shadows forces us to consider illumination as an additional dimension of phenomenal colors. For this purpose, I will first introduce two different interpretations of shadow-experiences, which Chalmers has called the simple and the complex interpretations, and show that they both fail to account for important phenomenal facts about shadow-experiences. I will then introduce my own alternative interpretation based on the idea that illumination is a dimension of phenomenal colors and explain how it can account for these facts.

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Rene Jagnow
University of Georgia

Citations of this work

Perceptual constancy and the dimensions of perceptual experience.John O’Dea - 2020 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 21 (2):421-434.
Are color experiences representational?Todd Ganson - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 166 (1):1-20.
Art and Ambiguity: A Gestalt-Shift Approach to Elusive Appearances.John O'Dea - 2018 - In Fabian Dorsch & Fiona Macpherson (eds.), Phenomenal Presence. Oxford University Press.
Colour Discrimination And Monitoring Theories of Consciousness.René Jagnow - 2012 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 90 (1):57-74.

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References found in this work

Vision.David Marr - 1982 - W. H. Freeman.
Action in Perception.Alva Noë - 2004 - MIT Press.
The problems of philosophy.Bertrand Russell - 1912 - New York: Barnes & Noble.
Perception and the fall from Eden.David J. Chalmers - 2006 - In Tamar Szabó Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.), Perceptual Experience. Oxford University Press. pp. 49--125.
Mental Reality.Galen Strawson - 1994 - Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.

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