Canadian Journal of Philosophy 43 (4):460-474 (2013)

Mark Jago
Nottingham University
According to truthmaker theory, particular truths are true in virtue of the existence of particular entities. Truthmaker maximalism holds that this is so for all truths. Negative existential and other ‘negative’ truths threaten the position. Despite this, maximalism is an appealing thesis for truthmaker theorists. This motivates interest in parsimonious maximalist theories, which do not posit extra entities for truthmaker duty. Such theories have been offered by David Lewis and Gideon Rosen, Ross Cameron, and Jonathan Schaffer. But these theories cannot be sustained, I’ll argue, and hence maximalism comes with a serious ontological cost. Neither Armstrong’s invocation of totality facts nor the Martin-Kukso line on absences can meet this cost satisfactorily. I’ll claim that negative facts are the best (and perhaps only) way out of the problem for the truthmaker maximalist.
Keywords Truthmaking  maximalism  negative facts  parsimony  ontology
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1080/00455091.2013.849059
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy

 PhilArchive page | Other versions
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

On the Plurality of Worlds.David Lewis - 1986 - Wiley-Blackwell.
Truth and Objectivity.Crispin Wright - 1992 - Harvard University Press.
Monism: The Priority of the Whole.Jonathan Schaffer - 2010 - Philosophical Review 119 (1):31-76.

View all 48 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Impossible Worlds.Mark Jago - 2013 - Noûs 47 (3):713-728.

View all 6 citations / Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Truthmaker Necessitarianism and Maximalism.Ross P. Cameron - 2005 - Logique Et Analyse 48 (189-192):43-56.
Traditional Christian Theism and Truthmaker Maximalism.Timothy Pawl - 2012 - European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 4 (1):197-218.
Expressibility and Truthmaker Maximalism: A Problem.J. Wisnewski - 2007 - Organon F: Medzinárodný Časopis Pre Analytickú Filozofiu 14 (1):49-52.
The Truthmaker Non-Maximalist's Dilemma.Mark Jago - 2012 - Mind 121 (484):903-918.
Change, Difference, and Orthodox Truthmaker Theory.Timothy Pawl - 2014 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 92 (3):539-550.
How to Be a Truthmaker Maximalist.Ross P. Cameron - 2008 - Noûs 42 (3):410 - 421.
The Hard Road to Presentism.Jamin Asay & Sam Baron - 2014 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 95 (3):314-335.
Truthmakers.Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra - 2006 - Philosophy Compass 1 (2):186–200.
The Problem with Truthmaker-Gap Epistemicism.Mark Jago - 2012 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 1 (4):320-329.
There is No 'Truthmaker' Argument Against Nominalism.Josh Parsons - 1999 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 77 (3):325 – 334.
Negative Truth and Falsehood.Stephen Mumford - 2007 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 107 (1pt1):45 - 71.


Added to PP index

Total views
591 ( #14,396 of 2,519,270 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
62 ( #12,847 of 2,519,270 )

How can I increase my downloads?


My notes