The Problem of Rational Knowledge

Erkenntnis (S6):1-18 (2013)

Authors
Mark Jago
Nottingham University
Abstract
Real-world agents do not know all consequences of what they know. But we are reluctant to say that a rational agent can fail to know some trivial consequence of what she knows. Since every consequence of what she knows can be reached via chains of trivial cot be dismissed easily, as some have attempted to do. Rather, a solution must give adequate weight to the normative requirements on rational agents’ epistemic states, without treating those agents as mathematically ideal reasoners. I’ll argue that agents can fail to know trivial consequences of what they know, but never determinately. Such cases are epistemic oversights on behalf of the agent in question, and the facts about epistemic oversights are always indeterminate facts. As a result, we are never in a position to assert that such-and-such constitutes an epistemic oversight for agent i (for we may rationally assert only determinate truths). I then develop formal epistemic models according to which epistemic accessibility relations are vague. Given these models, we can show that epistemic oversights always concern indeterminate cases of knowledge
Keywords Bounded rationality  Logical omniscience  Epistemic possibility  Knowledge  Rationality
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DOI 10.1007/s10670-013-9545-1
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References found in this work BETA

On the Plurality of Worlds.William G. Lycan - 1988 - Journal of Philosophy 85 (1):42-47.
Knowledge and Belief.Jaakko Hintikka - 1962 - Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

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Citations of this work BETA

A Dynamic Solution to the Problem of Logical Omniscience.Mattias Skipper & Jens Bjerring - 2019 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 48 (3):501-521.
Dynamic Epistemic Logic and Logical Omniscience.Mattias Skipper Rasmussen - 2015 - Logic and Logical Philosophy 24 (3):377-399.
No Rationality Through Brute-Force.Danilo Fraga Dantas - 2017 - Filosofia Unisinos 18 (3):195-200.

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