Why not color physicalism without color absolutism?

Behavioral and Brain Sciences 26 (1):34-35 (2003)
Abstract
We make three points. First, the concept of productance value that the authors propose in their defense of color physicalism fails to do the work for which it is intended. Second, the authors fail to offer an adequate physicalist account of what they call the hue-magnitudes. Third, their answer to the problem of individual differences faces serious difficulties.
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DOI 10.1017/S0140525X03360017
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Colour Constancy as Counterfactual.Jonathan Cohen - 2008 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 86 (1):61 – 92.
Perception, Color, and Realism.Wayne Wright - 2010 - Erkenntnis 73 (1):19 - 40.
Revelation and Normativity in Visual Experience.Zoltan Jakab - 2006 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 36 (1):25-56.

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