Definitions and Counter-Examples

Philosophy 62 (240):179 - 193 (1987)
In his paper ‘A Function for Thought Experiments’, T. S. Kuhn asks: Ought we demand of our concepts, as we do of our laws and theories, that they be applicable to any and every situation that might conceivably arise in any possible world? Is it not sufficient to demand of a concept, as we do of a law or theory, that it be unequivocally applicable in every situation which we expect ever to encounter?
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DOI 10.1017/S0031819100064020
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