Jack James
University of New England (Australia)
Despite distinguishing two very different notions of what time may be, the A and B theories of time inherently share an assumption in definition which has excluded a third field of possible explanation from being recognised and explored. In order to prove this rather grandiose proposition I will introduce a distinction between theories of resulting time and theories of non-resulting time. The clear articulation of why of this distinction is valid will be established by the method of reduction with regards to the construction and evolution of the definition of time in the physics of Aristotle and Einstein. This method reveals precisely the assumption in definition that has been made and carried forth in the defining of time in B theory, and also what has been forgone, being non-resulting theories of time. After such analysis and illustration of the proposed distinction with regards to B theory, it will be obvious that A theories of time dually share the assumption in definition. Thus having established that this distinction is very much real and that nearly all work in the philosophy and physics of time has thus far fallen into theories of resulting time, I will then demonstrate why new theories of non-resulting time could at the very least ‘quasi-solve’ some of the irreconcilable conflictions that have arisen within opposing theories of resulting time, using as example the A theorists/Presentist’s conflict with Special Relativity.
Keywords Time  Non-resulting time  SR  Special relativity
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