Rarity and endangerment: Why do they matter?

Environmental Values 33 (3):296-310 (2024)
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Abstract

It is often supposed that valuable organisms are more valuable if they are rare. Likewise if they belong to endangered species. I consider what kinds of value rarity and endangerment can add in such cases. I argue that individual organisms of a valuable species typically have instrumental value as means to the end of preserving their species. This progenitive value, I suggest, tends to increase exponentially with rarity. Endlings, for their part, typically have little progenitive value; however, I argue that they may nonetheless have persistence value because, merely by existing, they postpone the numerical extinction of their species. Finally, I propose that a sentient endling can have higher lifeworld value than it would have had were it not the last of its kind. This, I argue, is because when a sentient endling dies, very little of its lifeworld is preserved – and this, I suggest, can be a bad thing.

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Simon Paul James
Durham University

Citations of this work

Coemergent eco-consciousness and self-consciousness.Kalpita Bhar Paul - 2024 - Environmental Values 33 (3):253-256.
The ecology of finitude.Tom Greaves - 2024 - Environmental Values 33 (6):579-584.

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References found in this work

The Case for Animal Rights.Tom Regan & Mary Midgley - 1986 - The Personalist Forum 2 (1):67-71.
Animal Liberation.Bill Puka & Peter Singer - 1977 - Philosophical Review 86 (4):557.
Two distinctions in goodness.Christine M. Korsgaard - 1983 - Philosophical Review 92 (2):169-195.
A matter of individuality.David L. Hull - 1978 - Philosophy of Science 45 (3):335-360.
The Varieties of Intrinsic Value.John O’Neill - 1992 - The Monist 75 (2):119-137.

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