The Objectivity of Values: Invariance without Explanation

Southern Journal of Philosophy 44 (4):581-605 (2006)

This paper develops and motivates minimalism about the objectivity of values: the objectivity of values is no more, and no less, than invariance with respect to possible differences in attitudes. Thus the relation of invariance need not have any particular explanation, or, indeed, any explanation at all, for values to count as fully objective. Values need not be metaphysically real, simply in order to be objective, as according to traditional realist views. But we should not suppose, as some recent writers do, that there is no special issue of objectivity to consider: the issue of objectivity is the issue whether or how values vary with our attitudes
Keywords Analytic Philosophy  Contemporary Philosophy  General Interest
Categories No categories specified
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ISBN(s) 0038-4283
DOI 10.1111/j.2041-6962.2006.tb00019.x
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