Touch, sound, and things without the mind

Metaphilosophy 37 (2):162-182 (2006)
Two notable thought experiments are discussed in this article: Reid's thought experiment about whether a being supplied with tactile sensations alone could acquire the conception of extension and Strawson's thought experiment about whether a being supplied with auditory sensations alone could acquire the conception of mind-independent objects. The experiments are considered alongside Campbell's argument that only on the so-called relational view of experience is it possible for experiences to make available to their subjects the concept of mind-independent objects. I consider how the three issues ought to be construed as raising questions about woulds, coulds, or shoulds.
Keywords experience  Campbell  Strawson  mind‐independence  sound  extension  touch  Reid
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DOI 10.1111/j.1467-9973.2006.00429.x
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Frank Jackson (1982). Epiphenomenal Qualia. Philosophical Quarterly 32 (April):127-136.

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