Metaphilosophy 37 (2):162-182 (2006)
Two notable thought experiments are discussed in this article: Reid's thought experiment about whether a being supplied with tactile sensations alone could acquire the conception of extension and Strawson's thought experiment about whether a being supplied with auditory sensations alone could acquire the conception of mind-independent objects. The experiments are considered alongside Campbell's argument that only on the so-called relational view of experience is it possible for experiences to make available to their subjects the concept of mind-independent objects. I consider how the three issues ought to be construed as raising questions about woulds, coulds, or shoulds.
|Keywords||experience Campbell Strawson mind‐independence sound extension touch Reid|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
References found in this work BETA
Word and Object.Willard Van Orman Quine, Patricia Smith Churchland & Dagfinn Føllesdal - 2013 - MIT Press.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
A. Meinong: How to Get Into Touch with Things. [REVIEW]Francesca Modenato - 1996 - Axiomathes 7 (1-2):43-59.
Ethical Considerations in the Use of Nonerotic Touch in Psychotherapy with Children.Fawn M. McNeil-Haber - 2004 - Ethics and Behavior 14 (2):123 – 140.
Perception, Body, and the Sense of Touch: Phenomenology and Philosophy of Mind.Filip Mattens - 2009 - Husserl Studies 25 (2):97-120.
Bodies and Sensings: On the Uses of Husserlian Phenomenology for Feminist Theory.Alia Al-Saji - 2010 - Continental Philosophy Review 43 (1):13-37.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads109 ( #45,171 of 2,164,296 )
Recent downloads (6 months)5 ( #62,436 of 2,164,296 )
How can I increase my downloads?