The 'Self-Positing' Self in Kierkegaard's The Sickness unto Death

The European Legacy 16 (5):587 - 598 (2011)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

In response to the claim that Kierkegaard's highly compressed definition of the self, given near the beginning of The Sickness unto Death, should be understood in Hegelian terms, I show that it can be better understood in terms of an earlier development in the history of German idealism, namely, Fichte's theory of self-consciousness. The notion that the self ?posits? itself found in this theory will be used to explain Kierkegaard's definition of the self, including his rejection of the idea that the self posits itself absolutely. I go on to show how this conception of the self relates to certain features of the concept of despair described in The Sickness unto Death. This in turn allows me to indicate some implications of this conception of the self in relation to Kierkegaard's attitude towards the social and political forces shaping the modern world

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 76,215

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Analytics

Added to PP
2011-08-28

Downloads
99 (#126,551)

6 months
2 (#297,972)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Citations of this work

No citations found.

Add more citations

References found in this work

Abstract.[author unknown] - 2011 - Dialogue and Universalism 21 (4):447-449.
Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts. Hegel & J. Hoffmeister - 1960 - Revue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger 150:569-569.
Abstract.[author unknown] - 2004 - Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour 34 (4):447-449.

Add more references