The European Legacy 16 (5):587 - 598 (2011)

Abstract
In response to the claim that Kierkegaard's highly compressed definition of the self, given near the beginning of The Sickness unto Death, should be understood in Hegelian terms, I show that it can be better understood in terms of an earlier development in the history of German idealism, namely, Fichte's theory of self-consciousness. The notion that the self ?posits? itself found in this theory will be used to explain Kierkegaard's definition of the self, including his rejection of the idea that the self posits itself absolutely. I go on to show how this conception of the self relates to certain features of the concept of despair described in The Sickness unto Death. This in turn allows me to indicate some implications of this conception of the self in relation to Kierkegaard's attitude towards the social and political forces shaping the modern world
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DOI 10.1080/10848770.2011.599552
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Abstract.[author unknown] - 2011 - Dialogue and Universalism 21 (4):9-9.
Abstract.[author unknown] - 2004 - Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour 34 (4):447-449.
Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts. Hegel & J. Hoffmeister - 1960 - Revue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger 150:569-569.

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