Acta Analytica 23 (3):273-286 (2008)
In their recent book Philosophical Foundations of Neuroscience, Max Bennett and Peter Hacker attack neural materialism (NM), the view, roughly, that mental states (events, processes, etc.) are identical with neural states or material properties of neural states (events, processes, etc.). Specifically, in the penultimate chapter entitled “Reductionism,” they argue that NM is unintelligible, that “there is no sense to literally identifying neural states and configurations with psychological attributes.” This is a provocative claim indeed. If Bennett and Hacker are right, then a sizeable number of philosophers, cognitive scientists, neuroscientists, etc., subscribe to a view that is not merely false, but strictly meaningless. In this article I show that Bennett and Hacker's arguments against NM, whether construed as arguments for the meaninglessness of or the falsity of the thesis, cannot withstand scrutiny: when laid bare they are found to rest upon highly dubious assumptions that either seriously mischaracterize or underestimate the resources of the thesis.
|Keywords||Neural materialism Neuroscience Reductionism Multiple realizability Criteria of identity Mereological fallacy|
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Art, Mind and Religion.Hilary Putnam, W. H. Captain & D. D. Merrill - 1967 - In William H. Capitan & Daniel Davy Merrill (eds.), Art, Mind, and Religion. University of Pittsburgh Press.
Citations of this work BETA
Explaining How the Mind Works: On the Relation Between Cognitive Science and Philosophy.Jonathan Trigg & Michael Kalish - 2011 - Topics in Cognitive Science 3 (2):399-424.
Neuroscience and Subjectivity.John Cromby, Tim Newton & Simon J. Williams - 2011 - Subjectivity 4:215-226.
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