Dialectica 60 (1):63–77 (2006)
In this paper a candidate for a rational reconstruction of skeptical arguments is presented and defended against a competitor called ‘The Argument from Ignorance’. On the basis of this defense, Michael Williams’ claims that foundationalism and epistemological realism serve as presuppositions for skepticism are criticized. It is argued that rejecting these two theses, as his version of contextualism does, is not sufficient for answering the skeptical challenge.
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References found in this work BETA
Problems of Knowledge: A Critical Introduction to Epistemology.Michael Williams - 2001 - Oxford University Press.
Unnatural Doubts: Epistemological Realism and the Basis of Scepticism.Michael Williams - 1991 - Blackwell.
Citations of this work BETA
Anthony Brueckner Essays on Skepticism. Oxford University Press, 2010. Xi + 396 Pp. Isbn 978‐0‐19‐958586‐1. [REVIEW]Mikael Janvid - 2013 - Theoria 79 (4):378-382.
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