Contextualism and the structure of skeptical arguments

Dialectica 60 (1):63–77 (2006)
Abstract
In this paper a candidate for a rational reconstruction of skeptical arguments is presented and defended against a competitor called ‘The Argument from Ignorance’. On the basis of this defense, Michael Williams’ claims that foundationalism and epistemological realism serve as presuppositions for skepticism are criticized. It is argued that rejecting these two theses, as his version of contextualism does, is not sufficient for answering the skeptical challenge.
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DOI 10.1111/j.1746-8361.2005.01018.x
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Philosophical Explanations.Robert Nozick - 1981 - Harvard University Press.
Epistemic Operators.Fred I. Dretske - 1970 - Journal of Philosophy 67 (24):1007-1023.

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