Lewis's Global Descriptivism and Reference Magnetism

Frederique Janssen-Lauret
University of Manchester
Fraser MacBride
University of Manchester
In ‘Putnam’s Paradox’, Lewis defended global descriptivism and reference magnetism. According to Schwarz [2014], Lewis didn’t mean what he said there, and really held neither position. We present evidence from Lewis’s correspondence and publications which shows conclusively that Lewis endorsed both.
Keywords Lewis  reference magnetism  global descriptivism  naturalness  Putnam's Paradox
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Reprint years 2019
DOI 10.1080/00048402.2019.1619792
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