Lógica Y ontología

Theoria 4 (1):81-106 (1988)
In this paper we discuss the way logical consequence depends on what sets there are. We try to find out what set-theoretical assumptions have to be made to determine a logic, i.e., to give a definite answer to whether any given argument is correct. Consideration of second order logic -which is left highly indetermined by the usual set-theoretical axioms- prompts us to suggest a slightly different but natural nation of logical consequence, which reduces second order logic indeterminacy without interfering with first order logic
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DOI theoria1988/1989415
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