On the development of Husserl's transcendental phenomenology of imagination and its use for interdisciplinary research

In this paper I trace Husserl’s transformation of his notion of phantasy from its strong leanings towards empiricism into a transcendental phenomenology of imagination. Rejecting the view that this account is only more incompatible with contemporary neuroscientific research, I instead claim that the transcendental suspension of naturalistic (or scientific) pretensions precisely enables cooperation between the two distinct realms of phenomenology and science. In particular, a transcendental account of phantasy can disclose the specific accomplishments of imagination without prematurely deciding upon a particular scientific paradigm for its experimental investigation; a decision that is best left to the sciences themselves.
Keywords imagination  interdisciplinarity  phantasy  transcendental phenomenology
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DOI 10.1007/s11097-005-0135-9
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References found in this work BETA
Critique of Pure Reason.I. Kant - 1787/1998 - Philosophy 59 (230):555-557.
Unconscious Consciousness in Husserl and Freud.Rudolf Bernet - 2002 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 1 (3):327-351.

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