Revisiting Kantian Retributivism to Construct a Justification of Punishment

Criminal Law and Philosophy 2 (3):291-307 (2008)
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Abstract

The standard view of Kant’s retributivism, as well as its more recent reworking in the ‘limited’ or ‘partial’ retributivist reading are, it is argued here, inadequate accounts of Kant on punishment. In the case of the former, the view is too limited and superficial, and in the latter it is simply inaccurate as an interpretation of Kant. Instead, this paper argues that a more sophisticated and accurate rendering of Kant on punishment can be obtained by looking to his construction of the concept of justice. In so doing, not only is a superior account of Kant furnished, but also one up to the task of resolving the vexed issue of justifying legal punishment

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Citations of this work

Kant-Bibliographie 2008.Margit Ruffing - 2010 - Kant Studien 101 (4):487-538.

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References found in this work

The metaphysics of morals.Immanuel Kant - 1797/1996 - New York: Cambridge University Press. Edited by Mary J. Gregor.
Critique of Practical Reason.Immanuel Kant (ed.) - 1788 - New York,: Hackett Publishing Company.
Critique of Pure Reason.I. Kant - 1787/1998 - Philosophy 59 (230):555-557.
Prolegomena to any future metaphysics.Immanuel Kant - 2007 - Journal of Philosophy (16):507-508.

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