Abstract

In this article I initially focus on just one aspect of the complex systematic relation between Kant and Husserl: their notions of sensible representation. In my reading, I agree with realist interpretations of Kant and Husserl, which have been put forward against charges of representationalism in both fields independently from each other. By ‘representationalism’, I mean the construal of mind-world relations as relations between internal representations to external objects. In a second section, I argue that the realism implied by Kant’s and Husserl’s anti-representationalism should not surprise us but rather be expected as integral to the project of transcendental idealism. Obviously, the real task is to provide a coherent and comprehensive understanding of transcendental idealism in both Kant and Husserl given their strong realism. My task in this paper is a smaller one, namely to clarify those aspects of their transcendental idealisms that are directly relevant to their accounts of representation.