Theory Change and Bayesian Statistical Inference

Philosophy of Science 72 (5):1174-1186 (2005)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

This paper addresses the problem that Bayesian statistical inference cannot accommodate theory change, and proposes a framework for dealing with such changes. It first presents a scheme for generating predictions from observations by means of hypotheses. An example shows how the hypotheses represent the theoretical structure underlying the scheme. This is followed by an example of a change of hypotheses. The paper then presents a general framework for hypotheses change, and proposes the minimization of the distance between hypotheses as a rationality criterion. Finally the paper discusses the import of this for Bayesian statistical inference.

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 91,164

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

When can non‐commutative statistical inference be Bayesian?Miklós Rédei - 1992 - International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 6 (2):129-132.
The virtues of randomization.David Papineau - 1994 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 45 (2):437-450.
The theory of nomic probability.John L. Pollock - 1992 - Synthese 90 (2):263 - 299.
When can non-commutative statistical inference be bayesian? Mikl - 1992 - International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 6 (2):129 – 132.
A Generalisation of Bayesian Inference.Arthur Dempster - 1968 - Journal of the Royal Statistical Society Series B 30:205-247.

Analytics

Added to PP
2010-08-24

Downloads
63 (#246,026)

6 months
6 (#417,196)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Jan-Willem Romeijn
University of Groningen

References found in this work

Scientific reasoning: the Bayesian approach.Peter Urbach & Colin Howson - 1993 - Chicago: Open Court. Edited by Peter Urbach.
Bayesianism and language change.Jon Williamson - 2003 - Journal of Logic, Language and Information 12 (1):53-97.
Bayesianism and the Fixity of the Theoretical Framework.Donald Gillies - 2001 - In David Corfield & Jon Williamson (eds.), Foundations of Bayesianism. Kluwer Academic Publishers. pp. 363--379.

View all 7 references / Add more references