Acta Analytica 24 (4):263-274 (2009)
The notion of entitlement plays an important role in some influential epistemologies. Often the epistemological motive for introducing the concept is to accommodate certain externalist intuitions within an internalist framework or, conversely, to incorporate internalist traits into an otherwise externalist position. In this paper two prominent philosophers will be used as examples: Tyler Burge as a representative of the first option and Fred Dretske as one of the second. However, even on the assumption that the concept of entitlement is sufficiently clarified, accomplishing these results is easier said than done – especially if we also want to ascribe positive epistemic value to entitlement. It will be shown that the epistemic value of entitlement is either granted at the expense of the epistemic value of justification or the value ends up below the level of value at which the epistemologists employing the concept of entitlement are aiming.
|Keywords||Epistemic value Entitlement Externalism Internalism Burge Dretske|
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References found in this work BETA
Beyond Justification: Dimensions of Epistemic Evaluation.William Alston - 2005 - Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
Reliabilism and the Value of Knowledge.Alvin I. Goldman & Erik J. Olsson - 2009 - In A. Haddock, A. Millar & D. H. Pritchard (eds.), Epistemic Value. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 19--41.
Recent Work on Epistemic Value.Duncan Pritchard - 2007 - American Philosophical Quarterly 44 (2):85 - 110.
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