Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association 78:178-192 (2004)
The dualist-materialist dichotomy can be understood in terms of an apparently inconsistent triad of claims: materialism, mental realism, and antireductionism.At one time, functionalism seemed capable of resolving the apparent inconsistency, but recent work in the philosophy of mind suggests it cannot. Functionalism’sfailure invites exploration into alternative strategies for resolution, one of which is suggested by Aristotle’s hylomorphism. The latter rejects PostulationalRealism, a semantic model for psychological discourse endorsed by regnant forms of dualism and materialism, as well as by functionalism. Several considerations indicate that Postulational Realism is an implausible model for psychological discourse at best, and therefore suggest its rejection might pave the way to resolving the dualist-materialist dichotomy in the manner of hylomorphism
|Keywords||Catholic Tradition Conference Proceedings History of Philosophy Philosophy and Religion|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
Similar books and articles
Hylomorphism and Mental Causation.William Jaworski - 2005 - Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association 79:201-216.
Hylomorphism and Post-Cartesian Philosophy of Mind.William Jaworski - 2006 - Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association 80:209-224.
A Quasi-Materialist, Quasi-Dualist Solution to the Mind-Body Problem.John-Michael M. Kuczynski - 2004 - Kriterion: Journal of Philosophy 45 (109):81-135.
'Need a Christian Be a Mind/Body Dualist' ?Lynne Rudder Baker - 1995 - Faith and Philosophy 12 (4):489-504.
Mind-Body, Body-Mind: Two Distinct Problems.Benny Shanon - 2008 - Philosophical Psychology 21 (5):697 – 701.
Understanding Aristotle's Reproductive Hylomorphism.Devin Henry - 2006 - Apeiron 39 (3):257 - 287.
Consciousness: Philosophical, Psychological and Neural Theories.David Rose - 2006 - Oxford University Press.
Added to index2011-12-01
Total downloads83 ( #59,826 of 2,146,888 )
Recent downloads (6 months)5 ( #162,529 of 2,146,888 )
How can I increase my downloads?
There are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.