Multiple-realizability, explanation and the disjunctive move

Philosophical Studies 108 (3):289 - 308 (2002)
Abstract
The multiple-realizability argument has been the mainstay ofanti-reductionist consensus in philosophy of mind for the past thirty years. Reductionist opposition to it has sometimes taken the form of the Disjunctive Move: If mental types are multiply-realizable, they are not coextensive with physical types; they might nevertheless be coextensive with disjunctionsof physical types, and those disjunctions could still underwrite psychophysical reduction. Among anti-reductionists, confidence is high that the Disjunctive Move fails; arguments to this effect, however, often leave something to be desired. I raise difficulties for one anti-reductionist response to the DisjunctiveMove, the Explanatory Response.
Keywords Philosophy   Philosophy   Epistemology   Logic   Philosophy of Mind   Philosophy of Religion
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Animalism.Andrew M. Bailey - 2015 - Philosophy Compass 10 (12):867-883.
An Ideal Solution to Disputes About Multiply Realized Kinds.Colin Klein - 2008 - Philosophical Studies 140 (2):161 - 177.

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