Ethics 124 (2):242-271 (2014)

Authors
Julie Tannenbaum
Pomona College
Agnieszka Jaworska
University of California, Riverside
Abstract
Why does a baby who is otherwise cognitively similar to an animal such as a dog nevertheless have a higher moral status? We explain the difference in moral status as follows: the baby can, while a dog cannot, participate as a rearee in what we call “person-rearing relationships,” which can transform metaphysically and evaluatively the baby’s activities. The capacity to engage in these transformed activities has the same type of value as the very capacities (i.e., intellectual or emotional sophistication) that explain unimpaired adult humans’ high moral status. We attempt to extend this account to individuals with severe cognitive impairments
Keywords moral status  rearing-relationship  capacity
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Reprint years 2014
DOI 10.1086/673431
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The Grounds of Moral Status.Julie Tannenbaum & Agnieszka Jaworska - 2018 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy:0-0.
Were You a Part of Your Mother?Elselijn Kingma - 2019 - Mind 128 (511):609-646.
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If Abortion, Then Infanticide.David B. Hershenov & Rose J. Hershenov - 2017 - Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics 38 (5):387-409.

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