New Psychological Paradigm for Conditionals and General de Finetti Tables

Mind and Language 29 (1):73-84 (2014)
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Abstract

The new Bayesian paradigm in the psychology of reasoning aims to integrate the study of human reasoning, decision making, and rationality. It is supported by two findings. One, most people judge the probability of the indicative conditional, P, to be the conditional probability, P, as implied by the Ramsey test. Two, they judge if A then B to be void when A is false. Their three‐valued response table used to be called ‘defective’, but should be termed the de Finetti table. We show how to study general de Finetti truth tables for negations, conjunctions, disjunctions, and conditionals

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