Suppose that groups have reasons to act. Do the members of a group “inherit” the group’s reason? Alexander Dietz has recently argued that they do so in some circumstances. Dietz considers two principles. The first one – which I call the “Simple Principle” – claims that the members of a group always inherit the group’s reason. The second one – which I call “Dietz’s Principle,” which is the one Dietz advocates – claims that the members of a group inherit the group’s reason when they cooperate. Although Dietz thinks that the Simple Principle is intuitively appealing he argues that it has to be rejected because it has – in contrast to his own principle – counterintuitive implications. In this article, I shall try to show that Dietz’s Principle also has counterintuitive implications. Furthermore, I shall consider some revisions of Dietz’s Principle, but conclude that they are unattractive. Finally, I shall suggest that Dietz’s Principle is ad hoc.
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DOI 10.26556/jesp.v15i3.489
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What We Together Ought to Do.Alexander Dietz - 2016 - Ethics 126 (4):955-982.
Group Morality.Frank Jackson - 1987 - In J. J. C. Smart, Philip Pettit, Richard Sylvan & Jean Norman (eds.), Metaphysics and Morality: Essays in Honour of J.J.C. Smart. Blackwell.
The Morality of Collective Actions.Torbjorn Tannsjo - 1989 - Philosophical Quarterly 39 (155):221-228.

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