Born to be biased? Unrealistic optimism and error management theory

Philosophical Psychology 30 (8):1159-1175 (2017)
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Abstract

When individuals display cognitive biases, they are prone to developing systematically false beliefs. Evolutionary psychologists have argued that rather than being a flaw in human cognition, biases may actually be design features. In my paper, I assess the claim that unrealistic optimism is such a design feature because it is a form of error management. Proponents of this theory say that when individuals make decisions under uncertainty, it can be advantageous to err on the side of overconfidence if the potential gains through success are high and the costs of failure are low. I argue that there are a number of conceptual problems in matching the theory with the existing data. I also show that there is empirical evidence against the error management hypothesis.

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Anneli Jefferson
Cardiff University

Citations of this work

A new Philosophical Psychology.Lisa Bortolotti - 2022 - Philosophical Psychology 35 (1):1-5.

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References found in this work

The evolution of misbelief.Ryan McKay & Daniel Dennett - 2009 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 32 (6):493–510; discussion 510–61.

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