Indefinite probability judgment: A reply to Levi

Philosophy of Science 54 (4):586-591 (1987)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Isaac Levi and I have different views of probability and decision making. Here, without addressing the merits, I will try to answer some questions recently asked by Levi (1985) about what my view is, and how it relates to his.

Other Versions

No versions found

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 106,716

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Analytics

Added to PP
2009-01-28

Downloads
132 (#176,755)

6 months
12 (#298,089)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Citations of this work

Imprecise Probabilities.Seamus Bradley - 2019 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Comparative Probabilities.Jason Konek - 2019 - In Richard Pettigrew & Jonathan Weisberg, The Open Handbook of Formal Epistemology. PhilPapers Foundation. pp. 267-348.
Updating as Communication.Sarah Moss - 2012 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 85 (2):225-248.
Subjective Probabilities Need Not be Sharp.Jake Chandler - 2014 - Erkenntnis 79 (6):1273-1286.

View all 18 citations / Add more citations

References found in this work

The Foundations of Statistics.Leonard J. Savage - 1954 - Synthese 11 (1):86-89.
Decision theory as philosophy.Mark Kaplan - 1983 - Philosophy of Science 50 (4):549-577.
On indeterminate probabilities.Isaac Levi - 1974 - Journal of Philosophy 71 (13):391-418.
On Indeterminate Probabilities.Isaac Levi - 1978 - Journal of Philosophy 71 (13):233--261.
Imprecision and indeterminacy in probability judgment.Isaac Levi - 1985 - Philosophy of Science 52 (3):390-409.

View all 8 references / Add more references