- New
-
Topics
- All Categories
- Metaphysics and Epistemology
- Value Theory
- Science, Logic, and Mathematics
- Science, Logic, and Mathematics
- Logic and Philosophy of Logic
- Philosophy of Biology
- Philosophy of Cognitive Science
- Philosophy of Computing and Information
- Philosophy of Mathematics
- Philosophy of Physical Science
- Philosophy of Social Science
- Philosophy of Probability
- General Philosophy of Science
- Philosophy of Science, Misc
- History of Western Philosophy
- Philosophical Traditions
- Philosophy, Misc
- Other Academic Areas
- Journals
- Submit material
- More
Indefinite probability judgment: A reply to Levi
Philosophy of Science 54 (4):586-591 (1987)
Abstract
Isaac Levi and I have different views of probability and decision making. Here, without addressing the merits, I will try to answer some questions recently asked by Levi (1985) about what my view is, and how it relates to his.DOI
10.1086/289407
My notes
Similar books and articles
Levi's account of preference reversals.Erik Angner - 2002 - Economics and Philosophy 18 (2):287-302.
Direct inference and confirmational conditionalization.Isaac Levi - 1981 - Philosophy of Science 48 (4):532-552.
Imprecision and indeterminacy in probability judgment.Isaac Levi - 1985 - Philosophy of Science 52 (3):390-409.
An analysis of indefinite probability statements.John Bigelow & Robert Pargetter - 1987 - Synthese 73 (2):361 - 370.
Practical and scientific rationality: A bayesian perspective on Levi's difficulty.Mark Kaplan - 1983 - Synthese 57 (3):277 - 282.
Isaac Levi’s potentially surprising epistemologicalpicture.Wolfgang Spohn - 2006 - In Erik J. Olsson (ed.), Knowledge and Inquiry: Essays on the Pragmatism of Isaac Levi. Cambridge University Press.
Analytics
Added to PP
2009-01-28
Downloads
76 (#165,532)
6 months
6 (#146,135)
2009-01-28
Downloads
76 (#165,532)
6 months
6 (#146,135)
Historical graph of downloads
Citations of this work
Comparative Probabilities.Jason Konek - 2019 - In Richard Pettigrew & Jonathan Weisberg (eds.), The Open Handbook of Formal Epistemology. PhilPapers Foundation. pp. 267-348.
Updating as Communication.Sarah Moss - 2012 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 85 (2):225-248.
Global Constraints on Imprecise Credences: Solving Reflection Violations, Belief Inertia, and Other Puzzles.Sarah Moss - 2021 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 103 (3):620-638.
References found in this work
Imprecision and indeterminacy in probability judgment.Isaac Levi - 1985 - Philosophy of Science 52 (3):390-409.
PhilPapers logo by Andrea Andrews and Meghan Driscoll.
This site uses cookies and Google Analytics (see our terms & conditions for details regarding the privacy implications). Use of this site is subject to terms & conditions.
All rights reserved by The PhilPapers Foundation
Server: philpapers-web-9c67bdf98-f5q6x N