Risk and Human Rationality

The Monist 70 (2):223-236 (1987)
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Abstract

Personalistic Bayesian decision theory provides a simple, roomy framework for hypothesis-testing and choice under uncertainty. Call the theory Bayesianism, for short. It’s the line that L. J. Savage made respectable among statisticians and economists. It’s the same thing as the expected utility hypothesis, in this form: preference does or should go by personal probabilistic expectation of utility. The question of whether to say “does” or “should” is the question of whether the theory is meant to be normative or descriptive.

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Citations of this work

Is human cognition adaptive?John R. Anderson - 1991 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 14 (3):471-485.
Reply to Maher.Isaac Levi - 1989 - Economics and Philosophy 5 (1):79.

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