Authors
Steven Jensen
University of St. Thomas, Texas
Abstract
Christopher Tollefsen, relying on the new natural law theory, has suggested that in the Phoenix abortion case, the action might be characterized simply as removing the baby rather than killing the baby. Tollefsen and other proponents of the new natural law theory fail to give proper weight to the observable facts of the world around us, and thereby tend to ignore the importance of observable causes in shaping the character of our intentions and our actions. An appreciation of the role of causes reveals that our intentions cannot so readily land on one description of an action and exclude other descriptions. For the Phoenix case, the description “harming the baby” cannot fall outside the doctors’ intention. National Catholic Bioethics Quarterly 14.2 : 273–293.
Keywords Applied Philosophy  Business and Professional Ethics  Catholic Tradition
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ISBN(s) 1532-5490
DOI 10.5840/ncbq201414230
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