Authors
John Jenkinson
University of Western Ontario
Abstract
Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s philosophy of embodiment has been widely adopted by enactivists seeking to provide an account of cognition that is both embodied and embedded. Yet very little attention has been paid to Merleau-Ponty’s later works. This is troubling given that in The Visible and the Invisible Merleau-Ponty revises his conception of embodied subjectivity because he came to the realization that understanding consciousness through the concepts of subject and object imposed a dualistic framework that he was trying to escape. To overcome this dichotomy Merleau-Ponty more fully develops the radically embodied ontology implicit in his earlier work by introducing the concept of flesh. I argue that the enactive account of subjectivity would be improved by “giving flesh” to the enactive subject, given that the enactive account of subjectivity as grounded in pre-reflective bodily self-consciousness is ultimately rooted in accounts of which the later Merleau-Ponty is critical. Incorporating flesh resolves the underlying problems with the enactive account of subjectivity and makes the account more consistent with the ontological commitments to embodiment and embeddedness.
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
ISBN(s)
DOI 10.1007/s11097-016-9488-5
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 62,513
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

View all 38 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

The Poetry of ‘Flesh’ or the Reality of Perception? Merleau-Ponty’s Fundamental Error.Paul Crowther - 2015 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 23 (2):255-278.
Le mouvement ou la chair: deux conceptions de la profondeur ontologique selon Patočka et Merleau-Ponty.Jan Halak - 2013 - Meta: Research in Hermeneutics, Phenomenology, and Practical Philosophy 5 (1):83-104.
The Ontology and Ethics of Embodiment.Patricia M. Yahrmatter - 1998 - Dissertation, Vanderbilt University
Merleau-Ponty's Ontology 2e: Second Edition.M. C. Dillon - 1998 - Northwestern University Press.
The Reversibility Which is the Ultimate Truth.Jacob Rogozinski - 2016 - Continental Philosophy Review 49 (4):469-483.
Merleau-Ponty on Subjectivity and Intersubjectivity.Douglas Low - 1992 - International Studies in Philosophy 24 (3):45-64.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2016-10-11

Total views
42 ( #253,620 of 2,446,439 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
5 ( #147,968 of 2,446,439 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes