Mind and Language 32 (5):525-544 (2017)

Authors
Jennifer Nagel
University of Toronto, Mississauga
Abstract
Factive mental states, such as knowing or being aware, can only link an agent to the truth; by contrast, nonfactive states, such as believing or thinking, can link an agent to either truths or falsehoods. Researchers of mental state attribution often draw a sharp line between the capacity to attribute accurate states of mind and the capacity to attribute inaccurate or “reality-incongruent” states of mind, such as false belief. This article argues that the contrast that really matters for mental state attribution does not divide accurate from inaccurate states, but factive from nonfactive ones.
Keywords belief  factivity  knowledge  mental state attribution  mindreading
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DOI 10.1111/mila.12157
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References found in this work BETA

Knowledge and its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - Oxford University Press.
Knowledge and Its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - Philosophy 76 (297):460-464.
Knowledge and its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 64 (1):200-201.
Logic and Conversation.H. Paul Grice - 1975 - In Maite Ezcurdia & Robert J. Stainton (eds.), The Semantics-Pragmatics Boundary in Philosophy. Broadview Press. pp. 47.

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Citations of this work BETA

Beliefless Knowing.Paul Silva - 2019 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 100 (3):723-746.
Knowledge-First Believing the Unknowable.Simon Wimmer - 2019 - Synthese 198 (4):3855-3871.
Factive Theory of Mind.Jonathan Phillips & Aaron Norby - 2021 - Mind and Language 36 (1):3-26.

View all 10 citations / Add more citations

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