How Institutions Work in Shared Intentionality and ‘We-Mode’ Social Cognition

Topoi 35 (1):301-312 (2016)

Abstract
The topics of social ontology, culture, and institutions constitute a problem complex that involves a broad range of human social and cultural cognitive capacities. We-mode social cognition and shared intentionality appear to be crucial in the formation of social ontology and social institutions, which, in turn, provide the bases for the social manifestation of collective and shared psychological attitudes. Humans have ‘hybrid minds’ that inhabit cultural–cognitive ecosystems. Essentially, these consist of social institutions and distributed cognition that afford the common grounds for the objectives of we-mode shared intentionality. As such, they stabilize social cognition normatively and offer predictive power in social interaction. Full-blown we-mode shared intentionality fundamentally depends on the functions of social institutions
Keywords We-mode  Shared intentionality  Social institutions  Social ontology  Social cognition  Distributed cognition  Culture
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DOI 10.1007/s11245-015-9306-7
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Mind and World.Huw Price & John McDowell - 1994 - Philosophical Books 38 (3):169-181.

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