Oxford University Press (2021)

Authors
Jessica Brown
University of St. Andrews
Mona Simion
University of St. Andrews
Abstract
This volume is about the notion of 'defeat' in philosophy. The idea is that someone who has some knowledge, or a justified belief, can lose this knowledge or justified belief if they acquire a 'defeater' - evidence that undermines it. The contributors examine the role of defeat not just in epistemology but in practical reasoning and ethics.
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ISBN(s) 9780198847205   0198847203
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Reliabilist Epistemology.Alvin Goldman & Bob Beddor - 2021 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

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