The preservation of coherence

Studia Logica 43 (1-2):89 - 106 (1984)
Abstract
It is argued that the preservation of truth by an inference relation is of little interest when premiss sets are contradictory. The notion of a level of coherence is introduced and the utility of modal logics in the semantic representation of sets of higher coherence levels is noted. It is shown that this representative role cannot be transferred to first order logic via frame theory since the modal formulae expressing coherence level restrictions are not first order definable. Finally, an inference relation, calledyielding, is introduced which is intermediate between the coherence preservingforcing relation introduced elsewhere by the authors and the coherence destroying, inference relation of classical logic.
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DOI 10.1007/BF00935743
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References found in this work BETA
Logic for Equivocators.David Lewis - 1982 - Noûs 16 (3):431-441.
Inference and Necessity.P. K. Schotch & R. E. Jennings - 1980 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 9 (3):327-340.

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Citations of this work BETA
Dialetheism and the Impossibility of the World.Ben Martin - 2015 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 93 (1):61-75.
On the Completeness of First Degree Weakly Aggregative Modal Logics.Peter Apostoli - 1997 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 26 (2):169-180.
Modal Aggregation and the Theory of Paraconsistent Filters.Peter Apostoli - 1996 - Mathematical Logic Quarterly 42 (1):175-190.

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