Filosofiska Notiser 2 (1):39-45 (2015)

Sofia M.I. Jeppsson
Umeå University
Saul Smilansky’s theory of free will and moral responsibility consists of two parts; dualism and illusionism. Dualism is the thesis that both compatibilism and hard determinism are partly true, and has puzzled many philosophers. I argue that Smilansky’s dualism can be given an unquestionably coherent and comprehensible interpretation if we reformulate it in terms of pro tanto reasons. Dualism so understood is the thesis that respect for persons gives us pro tanto reasons to blame wrongdoers, and also pro tanto reasons not to blame them. These reasons must be we ighed against each other (and against relevant consequentialist reasons) in order to find out what we all things considered ought to do.
Keywords Smilansky  dualism  moral responsibility
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References found in this work BETA

Justice for Hedgehogs.Ronald Dworkin - 2011 - Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.
Living Without Free Will.Derk Pereboom - 2001 - Cambridge University Press.
Free Will and Illusion.Saul Smilansky - 2000 - Oxford University Press.

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