Negative mechanistic reasoning in medical intervention assessment

Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics 36 (6):425-437 (2015)
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Abstract

Traditionally, mechanistic reasoning has been assigned a negligible role in standard EBM literature, although some recent authors have argued for an upgrade. Even so, the mechanistic reasoning that has received attention has almost exclusively been positive—both in an epistemic sense of claiming that there is a mechanistic chain and in a health-related sense of there being claimed benefits for the patient. Negative mechanistic reasoning has been neglected, both in the epistemic and in the health-related sense. I distinguish three main types of negative mechanistic reasoning and subsume them under a new definition of mechanistic reasoning in the context of assessing medical interventions. This definition is wider than a previous suggestion in the literature. Each negative type corresponds to a range of evidential strengths, and it is argued that there are differences with respect to typical evidential strengths. The variety of negative mechanistic reasoning should be acknowledged in EBM, and it presents a serious challenge to proponents of so-called medical hierarchies of evidence.

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Citations of this work

Mechanisms in clinical practice: use and justification.Mark R. Tonelli & Jon Williamson - 2020 - Medicine, Health Care and Philosophy 23 (1):115-124.
Treatment Effectiveness and the Russo–Williamson Thesis, EBM+, and Bradford Hill's Viewpoints.Steven Tresker - 2022 - International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 34 (3):131-158.

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References found in this work

The philosophy of evidence-based medicine.Jeremy H. Howick - 2011 - Chichester, West Sussex, UK: Wiley-Blackwell, BMJ Books.
What is a mechanism? Thinking about mechanisms across the sciences.Phyllis Illari & Jon Williamson - 2012 - European Journal for Philosophy of Science 2 (1):119-135.
Evidence.Thomas Kelly - 2006 - Philosophy Compass.

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