Paradoxical Desires


Authors
Ethan Jerzak
University of California, Berkeley
Abstract
I present a paradoxical combination of desires. I show why it's paradoxical, and consider ways of responding. The paradox saddles us with an unappealing trilemma: either we reject the possibility of the case by placing surprising restrictions on what we can desire, or we deny plausibly constitutive principles linking desires to the conditions under which they are satisfied, or we revise some bit of classical logic. I argue that denying the possibility of the case is unmotivated on any reasonable way of thinking about mental content, and rejecting those desire-satisfaction principles leads to revenge paradoxes. So the best response is a non-classical one, according to which certain desires are neither determinately satisfied nor determinately not satisfied. Thus, theorizing about paradoxical propositional attitudes helps constrain the space of possibilities for adequate solutions to semantic paradoxes more generally.
Keywords Semantic paradoxes  Desire  Externalism  Non-classical logic  Content
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DOI 10.1093/arisoc/aoz003
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References found in this work BETA

Saving Truth From Paradox.Hartry Field - 2008 - Oxford University Press.
The Language of Thought.Jerry A. Fodor - 1975 - Harvard University Press.
Individualism and the Mental.Tyler Burge - 1979 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 4 (1):73-122.
The Language of Thought.Jerry A. Fodor - 1975 - Noûs 14 (1):120-124.
Attitudes de Dicto and de Se.David Lewis - 1979 - Philosophical Review 88 (4):513-543.

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