Donnellan on neptune

Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 63 (1):111-135 (2001)
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Abstract

Donnellan famously argued that while one can fix the reference of a name with a definite description, one cannot thereby have a de re belief about the named object. All that is generated is meta-linguistic knowledge that the sentence “If there is a unique F, then N is F” is true. Donnellan’s argument and the sceptical position are extremely influential. This article aims to show that Donnellan’s argument is unsound, and that the Millian who embraces Donnellan’s scepticism that the reference-fixer cannot secure the relevant de re belief faces a serious problem: Millianism about names plus scepticism about the reference-fixer’s de re belief conflicts with what seems to be an analytical thesis about the relationship between semantic content and understanding. The upshot is that the Millian has good reason to seek an alternative to scepticism

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Robin Jeshion
University of Southern California

Citations of this work

Two-dimensionalism: A neo-Fregean interpretation.Manuel García-Carpintero - 2006 - In Manuel Garcia-Carpintero & Josep Macià (eds.), Two-Dimensional Semantics. New York: Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Complex demonstratives and their singular contents.David Braun - 2008 - Linguistics and Philosophy 31 (1):57-99.
Bivalence and what is said.Manuel García-Carpintero - 2007 - Dialectica 61 (1):167–190.

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References found in this work

Naming and Necessity: Lectures Given to the Princeton University Philosophy Colloquium.Saul A. Kripke - 1980 - Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Edited by Darragh Byrne & Max Kölbel.
The Varieties of Reference.Gareth Evans - 1982 - Oxford: Oxford University Press. Edited by John Henry McDowell.
Demonstratives: An Essay on the Semantics, Logic, Metaphysics and Epistemology of Demonstratives and other Indexicals.David Kaplan - 1989 - In Joseph Almog, John Perry & Howard Wettstein (eds.), Themes From Kaplan. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 481-563.
The Nature of Necessity.Alvin Plantinga - 1974 - Oxford, England: Clarendon Press.

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