Knowing that p rather than q

Sorites 20:125-134 (2008)

I offer a two-tiered critique of epistemological contrastivism as developed by Jonathan Schaffer. First, I investigate the cornerstone of contrastivism, the notion of knowing the selected proposition p rather than the eliminated, or contrast, proposition q. Contrastivism imposes the ternicity constraint that the knowledge relation should span a knower and two propositions. However, contrastivism has yet to explain how to square this constraint with the required contrast between the selected and the eliminated propositions, and it is not immediately obvious how to accomplish this. I offer up for consideration the binary proposal that to know that p rather than q is to know that the conjunction of p and the negation of q is true. Second, I argue that contrastivist objects of knowledge ought to be hyperpropositions rather than functions from possible worlds to truth-values, as assumed by Schaffer
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Epistemic Contrastivism.Peter Baumann - 2017 - Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Nearly Solving the Problem of Nearly Convergent Knowledge.Peter Baumann - 2018 - Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective 7 (10):16-21.

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