Das Konsequenzargument

In Rolf W. Puster (ed.), Klassische Argumentationen der Philosophie. pp. 275-296 (2013)

Christoph Jäger
University of Innsbruck
The paper reconstructs causal and theological versions of the consequence argument against the compatibility of free will and determinism and discusses the most influential objections to them.
Keywords consequence argument  Peter van Inwagen  theological consequence argument  rule beta  free will  libertarianism  incompatibilism  determinism  moral responsibility
Categories (categorize this paper)
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Translate to english
Revision history

Download options

Our Archive
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Willensfreiheit.Geert Keil - 2007 - De Gruyter.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Van Inwagen’s Consequence Argument.Michael Huemer - 2000 - Philosophical Review 109 (4):525-544.
Tollensing van Inwagen.Harold W. Noonan - 2014 - Philosophia 42 (4):1055-1061.
So-Far Incompatibilism and the so-Far Consequence Argument.Stephen Hetherington - 2006 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 73 (1):163-178.
Lehrer and the Consequence Argument.Danilo Šuster - 2012 - Philosophical Studies 161 (1):77-86.
The Core of the Consequence Argument.Alex Blum - 2003 - Dialectica 57 (4):423-429.
The Consequence Argument.Peter van Inwagen - 2008 - In Peter Van Inwagen & Dean W. Zimmerman (eds.), Metaphysics: The Big Questions. Blackwell.
The Incompatibility of Free Will and Naturalism.Jason Turner - 2009 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 87 (4):565-587.
Compatibilism and the Consequence Argument.Terence Horgan - 1985 - Philosophical Studies 47 (May):339-56.


Added to PP index

Total views
1,145 ( #2,338 of 2,286,122 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
136 ( #4,035 of 2,286,122 )

How can I increase my downloads?


My notes

Sign in to use this feature