Authors
Christoph Jäger
University of Innsbruck
Abstract
In his recent book Willensfreiheit Geert Keil defends a version of libertarianism. Yet he criticizes a flagship argument for incompatibilism. Van Inwagen's consequence argument, Keil thinks, relies on an irrelevant premise when it claims that agents have no choice about the remote past. I argue that Keil's charge rests on a misunderstanding. I then sketch why discussions of the consequence argument should focus on the question whether or not a certain version of rule Beta is valid
Keywords Konsequenzargument  Willensfreiheit  moralische Verantwortung  Inkompatibilismus  Kompatibilismus  Determinismus  van Inwagen  theologisches Konsequenzargument  consequence argument  free will
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DOI 10.1524/dzph.2009.0009
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References found in this work BETA

Modal Logic: An Introduction.Brian F. Chellas - 1980 - Cambridge University Press.
On Action.Carl Ginet - 1990 - Cambridge University Press.
The Significance of Free Will.Robert Kane - 1996 - Philosophical and Phenomenological Research 60 (1):129-134.
The Incompatibility of Free Will and Determinism.Peter Van Inwagen - 1975 - Philosophical Studies 27 (3):185 - 199.

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