Theoria 77 (3):223-237 (2011)

Christoph Jäger
University of Innsbruck
In “Process Reliabilism and the Value Problem” I argue that Erik Olsson and Alvin Goldman's conditional probability solution to the value problem in epistemology is unsuccessful and that it makes significant internalist concessions. In “Kinds of Learning and the Likelihood of Future True Beliefs” Olsson and Martin Jönsson try to show that my argument does “not in the end reduce the plausibility” of Olsson and Goldman's account. Here I argue that, while Olsson and Jönsson clarify and amend the conditional probability approach in a number of helpful ways, my case against it remains intact. I conclude with a constructive proposal as to how their account may be steered in a more promising direction.
Keywords swamping problem  value problem  reliabilism  conditional probability solution  value of knowledge
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DOI 10.1111/j.1755-2567.2011.01104.x
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References found in this work BETA

Epistemology and Cognition.Alvin I. Goldman - 1986 - Harvard University Press.
Reliabilism and the Value of Knowledge.Alvin I. Goldman & Erik J. Olsson - 2009 - In Adrian Haddock, Alan Millar & Duncan Pritchard (eds.), Epistemic Value. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 19--41.
Reliabilism and the Extra Value of Knowledge.Wayne A. Davis & Christoph Jäger - 2012 - Philosophical Studies 157 (1):93-105.

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The Value of Knowledge.Erik J. Olsson - 2011 - Philosophy Compass 6 (12):874-883.

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