In Carlos Ulises Moulines and Karl-Georg Niebergall (ed.), Argument und Analyse. mentis. pp. 403-423 (2002)

Christoph Jäger
University of Innsbruck
I discuss Alston's theory of religious experience and maintain that his argument to the effect that it is rational to suppose that the 'mystical doxastic practice' is epistemically reliable does not stand up to scrutiny. While Alston's transitions from practical to epistemic rationality don't work here, his arguments may be taken to show that, under certain conditions, it is not epistemically irresponsible to trust one's religious experiences.
Keywords William Alston  religious experience  religious belief  epistemic circularity  epistemic rationality  epistemic justification  reliabilism  mystical experience  practical rationality  doxastic practice
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